

## Message Text

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ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 EA-07 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 H-02 INR-07

L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06

SAJ-01 ACDA-05 OMB-01 EB-07 IO-10 SAM-01 NEA-10 /101 W

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R 230926Z OCT 75

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5939

INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK

AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

AMEMBASSY BERLIN

USMISSION USBERLIN

AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST

AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

CINCPAC

AMCONSUL HONG KONG

AMEMBASSY JAKARTA

AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR

AMCONSUL LENINGRAD

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MANILA

AMCONSUL MUNICH

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE

AMEMBASSY SOFIA

AMEMBASSY TAIPEI

AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 MOSCOW 15238

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

E.O. 11652 GDS

TAGS: PFOR, CH, UR, VN, XC, JA

SUBJECT: KAPITSA ON SOUTHEAST ASIA

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REF: MOSCOW 14593 (NOTAL) B. MOSCOW 15237

1. SUMMARY. IN CONVERSATION WITH KAPITSA OCTOBER 22 (REFTEL) HE DISCOUNTED SIHANOUK'S INFLUENCE IN CAMBODIA, AND SAID THAT THE CHINESE CURRENTLY HAVE THE GREATEST VOICE IN THAT COUNTRY. OVER THE LONG RUN, HOWEVER, HE EXPECTED THAT THE CHINESE WOULD LOSE THEIR DOMINANT INFLUENCE IN PHNOM PENH. IN VIETNAM, HE SAID THAT THE REUNIFICATION PROCESS HAS FOR PRACTICAL PURPOSES ALMOST TAKEN PLACE, AND THAT THE CURRENT POLITICAL CLIMATE IS NOT CONDUCTIVE TO RESOLUTION OF U.S.-VIETNAMESE PROBLEMS. HE DENIED THAT VIETNAM HAS ANY AGGRESSIVE INTENTIONS TOWARD NEIGHBORS SUCH AS THAILAND. ACCORDING TO KAPITSA, HANOI IS CLOSER TO THE USSR THAN CHINA ON WORLD ISSUES. KAPITSA STRESSED THAT SOVIET COLLECTIVE SECURITY PROPOSALS WERE LONG-RANGE IN NATURE AND THAT SOVIETS DID NOT EXPECT ANY PROGRESS IN THIS REGARD DURING THE NEXT DECADE. HE ALSO POINTED OUT THAT THE USSR IS NOT HOSTILE TO ASEAN OR TO THE ASEAN COUNTRIES. END SUMMARY.

2. COMBODIA. WHEN ASKED ABOUT THE CURRENT SITUATION IN CAMBODIA, KAPITSA COMMENTED THAT SIHANOUK HAS NO POLITICAL IMPORTANCE. HE HAS NO FUTURE IN CAMBODIA, KAPITSA SAID. IN SOME AREAS PRO-CHINESE ELEMENTS DOMINATE, IN OTHER PLACES PRO-VIETNAMESE ARE IN CHARGE, AND IN STILL OTHER LOCALITIES NATIONALISTS, WHO OPPOSE BOTH THE OTHER GROUPS, WIELD POWER. THE KEY PROBLEM IN CAMBODIA NOW IS THE INTERNAL STRUGGLE BETWEEN THESE FACTIONS. THOSE CAMBODIANS WHO WERE NOT PRESENT DURING THE WAR, KAPITSA SAID, MORE AND MORE ARE INFLUENCING EVENTS IN PHNOM PENH, BUT THEY DO NOT HAVE DEEP SUPPORT WITHIN THE COUNTRY. HOWEVER, AFTER ANALYZING THE STRENGTH OF THE THREE GROUPS HE IS CONFIDENT THAT THE CHINESE WOULD EVENTUALLY LOSE THEIR DOMINANT INFLUENCE IN PHNOM PENH. CAMBODIA WILL NOT BE TURNED INTO ANOTHER ALBANIA, KAPITSA SAID, PLACING THE ODDS AT 60/40 THAT THIS WOULD NOT OCCUR. HE SAID THE BASED THIS BELIEF ON THE NATURE OF THE CAMBODIAN PEOPLE AND THE INEVITABLE INFLUENCE OF THE VIETNAMESE. KAPITSA ALSO COMMENTED THAT NO FOREIGN EMBASSIES OTHER THAN VIETNAM AND CHINA WOULD BE PERMITTED IN PHNOMPENH FOR A LONG TIME.

3. VIETNAM. WHEN ASKED ABOUT PROSPECTS FOR REUNIFICATION OF THE TWO VIETNAMS, KAPITSA REPLIED THAT THE REUNIFICATION PROCESS HAS FOR ALL PRACTICAL EFFECTS ALREADY TAKEN PLACE, THAT THERE IS ONE CONFIDENTIAL

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COMMUNIST PARTY IN CHARGE, AND THAT JOINT PLANNING FOR BOTH COUNTIRES HAS NOW BEEN IMPLEMENTED. FOR THIS REASON, HE SAID, HE ANTICIPATES NO NEED FOR FOREIGN EMBASSIES IN SOUTH VIETNAM. ON THE OTHER HAND, KAPITSA ADDED, THE VIETNAMESE HAVE TO SOLVE SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS IN SOUTH VIETNAM BEFORE ACTUAL JURIDICAL REUNIFICATION CAN TAKE PLACE. CHOLON, FOR EXAMPLE, IS A GREAT PROBLEM BECAUSE OF THE 1.2 MILLION CHINESE THERE WHO ACCUMULATED HUGE WEALTH DURING THE WAR. FOR THE VIETNAMESE THIS

IS NOT AN EASY PROBLEM, ESPECIALLY AS THE CHINESE HAVE DEMONSTRATED AN INTEREST IN THE POPULATION OF CHOLON. THE VIETNAMESE ATTITUDE, HOWEVER, IS THAT IT IS NONE OF PEKING'S BUSINESS. "THIEU" HAD DECLARED THEM ALL VIETNAMESE CITIZENS AND THE VIETNAMESE NOW ACCEPT THIS. THE CAPITAL ACCUMULATED BY THE CHINESE IS ALSO NONE OF PEKING'S BUSINESS, ACCORDING TO HANOI. THE OVERSEAS CHINESE IN VIETNAM HAVE NOW BEEN DEPRIVED OF THEIR MONEY THROUGH RECENTLY IMPLEMENTED FINANCIAL REFORMS, IN ANY CASE, BUT THIS STILL REMAINS A PROBLEM BETWEEN HANOI AND PEKING. ON THE OTHER HAND, KAPITSA SAID IT WAS HIS IMPRESSION THAT CHINA EXAGGERATES THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE VIETNAMESE AND THEMSELVES IN ACCUSING HANOI OF HOSTILE INTENTIONS TOWARD ITS NEIGHBORS. VIETNAM HAS SO MANY INTERNAL PROBLEMS TO SOLVE IT IS "STRANGE" TO ACCUSE HANOI OF SUCH INTENTIONS TOWARD NEIGHBORS LIKE THAILAND, KAPITSA SAID.

4. IF THE TWO VIETNAMS ARE CLOSE TO REUNIFICATION, I SAID, THIS WOULD SURELY TAKE AWAY SOME OF THE FORCE FROM THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE CLAIM TO BE REPRESENTED AS A SEPARATE ENTITY IN THE UN. SOMEWHAT DISCOMFITED, KAPITSA REPLIED THAT THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE HAVE THIS RIGHT. THE SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE NORTH AND SOUTH ARE NOT AT THE SAME LEVEL, HE SAID. THE SOUTH IS STILL A BOURGEOIS, DEMOCRATIC STATE AND HAS A DIFFERENT ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND POLITICAL STRUCTURE THAN THE NORTH. THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT IS COMPOSED OF PROGRESSIVES, SAIGON REGIME ELEMENTS, AND ALSO THE SO-CALLED THIRD FORCES. HOWEVER, KAPITSA ADDED, MANY OF THE LATTER WAITED IN FRANCE FOR TOO LONG REALLY TO INFLUENCE FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOUTH. KAPITSA STATED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD OUR OBJECTIONS AGAINST SEATING BOTH VIETNAMS IN THE UN, BUT SAID THAT IT WAS HIS IMPRESSION THAT THE U.S. IS THE ULTIMATE LOSER BECAUSE OF THIS POLICY AND WILL BE ISOLATED IN PURSUING IT.

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5. I SAID TO KAPITSA THAT WE WELCOME THE FACT THAT HANOI HAS INDICATED WILLINGNESS TO LET SOME AMERICANS BE REPATRIATED FROM VIETNAM (STATE 250584) BUT ADDED THAT THERE ARE STILL OTHER AMERICAN DETAINED IN VIETNAM WHOM WE ARE ANXIOUS ABOUT. WE ALSO HAVE NOT AS YET RECEIVED SATISFACTORY INFORMATION FROM THE VIETNAMESE ABOUT AMERICANS MISSING IN ACTION DURING THE WAR. MAKING CLEAR THAT I WAS NOT SPEAKING ON THE BASIS OF INSTRUCTIONS, I ASKED KAPITSA WHETHER THIS PROBLEM MIGHT BE DISCUSSED WITH LE DUAN DURING HIS VISIT HERE THE END OF THIS MONTH. (KAPITSA HAD MENTIONED SUCH A POSSIBILITY TO AUSTRALIAN AMBASSADOR PLIMSOLL IN A RECENT CONVERSATION--REFTEL A). KAPITSA REPLIED THAT IT WAS THE U.S. WHICH CREATED A PROBLEM IN THIS REGARD AND THAT THERE DOES NOT EXIST THE RIGHT POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE FOR MAKING PROGRESS ON THESE ISSUES. HE SAID BY FOLLOWING POLICIES SUCH AS THE VETOING OF THE VIETNAMESE FROM ENTRY INTO THE UN WASHINGTON IS

JUST ISOLATING ITSELF. "WE DO NOT WANT YOU TO BE ISOLATED,"  
KAPITSA ADDED, "WE HAVE THE SAME GENERAL INTERESTS THAT YOU HAVE."  
(DESPITE KAPITSA'S GENERALLY NEGATIVE REPLY, IT WAS OF INTEREST  
THAT IGOR ROGACHEV, KAPITSA'S DEPUTY, WHO WAS ALSO PRESENT AS WAS  
POLITICAL CONSELOR BREMENT, MADE A CAREFUL NOTE WHEN I RAISED  
THE POSSIBLITIY OF MENTIONING THIS SUBJECT TO LE DUAN.)

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SAJ-01 ACDA-05 OMB-01 EB-07 IO-10 SAM-01 NEA-10 /101 W

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R 230926Z OCT 75  
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5940  
INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK  
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE  
AMEMBASSY BERLIN  
USMISSION USBERLIN  
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST  
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST  
CINCPAC  
AMCONSUL HONG KONG  
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA  
AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR  
AMCONSUL LENINGRAD  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY MANILA  
AMCONSUL MUNICH  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE  
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE  
AMEMBASSY SOFIA  
AMEMBASSY TAIPEI  
AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE  
AMEMBASSY WARSAW

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6. WHEN ASKED FURTHER ABOUT THE LE DUAN VISIT, KAPITSA SAID THAT THE VIETNAMESE FIRST SECRETARY WILL BE COMING HERE FOR TALKS AT THE END OF THE MONTH AND THAT AFTER THE TALKS HE WILL THEN  
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VACATION IN THE USSR. THE VIETNAMESE NEED MUCH AID FROM US, HE SAID, INCLUDING GRAIN. HE POINTED OUT IN THIS REGARD THAT ALTHOUGH SOME DIFFERENCES HAD EMERGED DURING RECENT VIETNAMESE CONVERSATIONS WITH THE CHINESE, PEKING DID GIVE VIET NAM GENEROUS ASSISTANCE AS A RESULT OF THOSE TALKS.

7. HANOI HAS A DIFFICULT PROBLEM IN BALANCING OFF RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND WITH CHINA, KAPITSA SAID. THE VIETNAMESE SYMPATHIZE WITH THE USSR GENERALLY AND DO NOT AGREE WITH THE CHINESE ASSESSMENT THAT THE USSR IS A SOCIAL-IMPERIALIST FASCIST STATE. AT THE SAME TIME CHINA IS A HUGE NEIGHBOR AND ITS VIEWS MUST BE CONSIDERED BY THE VIETNAMESE. THE VIETNAMESE WILL, THEREFORE, CONTINUE THE SAME POLICY THAT THEY CARRIED ON DURING THE WAR IN THEIR CONDUCT OF RELATIONS WITH MOSCOW AND PEKING. IT WILL GO BACK AND FORTH, SAID KAPITSA, SOMETIME IT WILL BE 60/40 AND SOMETIME 50/50, BUT GENERALLY THE VIETNAMESE ARE CLOSER TO THE USSR THAN TO CHINA ON VARIOUS WORLD ISSUES.

8. ASIAN COLLECTIVE SECURITY. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION AS TO WHETHER THE VIETNAMESE SUPPORT SOVIET PROPOSALS FOR A COLLECTIVE SECURITY AGREEMENT IN ASIA, KAPITSA SAID THAT DURING THE WAR HANOI WAS COMPLETELY AGAINST THIS IDEA. NOW, HOWEVER, THEY ARE NOT AGAINST IT FORMALLY AND DEFINITELY, BUT ARE ALSO NOT IN A HURRY TO SUPPORT IT. KAPITSA SAID THAT IN ANY CASE THE SOVIET COLLECTIVE SECURITY PROPOSALS WERE LONG-RANGE AND MIGHT NOT BE IMPLEMENTED FOR PERHAPS FIFTY YEARS, CERTAINLY NOT WITHIN THE NEXT FIVE OR TEN YEARS. FURTHERMORE, A FORMULA ON ASIAN SECURITY CANNOT BE FULLY ARTICULATED AT THIS TIME. WHAT WE ENVISION, HE SAID, MIGHT BE A TREATY OF PEACE OR OF MUTUAL SECURITY, AN AGREEMENT ON THE NON-USE OF FORCE OR AGAINST AGRESSION, OR SOMETHING ALONG SUCH LINES. WHEN ASKED AS TO WHAT AREA SUCH AN AGREEMENT WOULD COVER, KAPITSA SAID THAT IT WOULD CERTAINLY INCLUDE THE MIDDLE EAST AND PROBABLY AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND, AND THAT THE MAJOR POWERS SHOULD ALSO BE INCLUDED. THE FIRST OBLIGATION WOULD BE TO REFRAIN FROM WAR AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POLICY; IN OTHER WORDS, SUPPORT FOR THE NON-USE OF FORCE AND NON-INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF OTHER COUNTRIES. WE ARE PRACTICAL PEOPLE, HE SAID, AND REALIZE THAT THE SETTLEMENT OF BORDER PROBLEMS WILL BE FAR MORE DIFFICULT IN ASIA THAN IN EUROPE. THUS ANY STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLE ON THE INVIOABILITY OF BORDERS MIGHT NOT BE ACCEPTED.

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9. WHAT WE ARE DOING NOW, KAPITSA CONTINUED, IS COMPARABLE TO A HUNTER IN THE WOODS WHO HAS A FIRE GOING. EVERY ONCE IN A WHILE WE ADD A LOG TO THE FIRE TO KEEP IT BURNING, BUT WE ARE NOT IN A HURRY AND WE HAVE NO PLANS TO ACCELERATE OUR EFFORTS. FURTHERMORE, WE REALIZE THAT WHEREAS SEVERAL YEARS AGO 60 PER CENT OF THE ASIAN STATES SUPPORTED THIS GENERAL CONCEPT, NOW ONLY 40 PER CENT FAVOR IT. KAPITSA REITERATED THAT THIS SOVIET PROPOSAL WAS NOT DIRECTED AGAINST CHINA. WE DO NOT WISH TO SET UP SUCH AN AGREEMENT WITHOUT CHINA. THIS WOULD CONSTITUTE A BLOC AND BLOCS ARE NOW OUTMODED.

10. ASEAN. WHEN ASKED ABOUT RECENT SOVIET PRESS ARTICLES WHICH HAVE BEEN FAIRLY HOSTILE TO ASEAN, KAPITSA REPLIED THAT ONE HAD TO DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN THE SOVIET PROPAGANDA POSITION AND ITS DIPLOMATIC POSITION. WE ARE REALISTS, HE STATED, AND CARRY ON A REALISTIC POLICY. OCCASIONALLY, ARTICLES APPEAR IN THE PRESS, BUT THIS IS LARGELY THE RESULT OF INERTIA AND, HE SAID, WE ARE CERTAINLY NOT HOSTILE TO ASEAN OR THE ASEAN COUNTRIES.  
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## Message Attributes

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